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HOUSING OUR CRIMINALS: 
FINDING HOUSING FOR THE EX-
OFFENDER IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 
"Courts, commentators, and legislatures have recognized that 
a person with a criminal record is often burdened by social 
stigma, subjected to additional investigation, prejudiced in 
future criminal proceedings, and discriminated against by 
prospective employers."l 
"The only way they can get away with it is because it affects 
poor people."2 
INTRODUCTION 
Crime control is an obsession in the United States.3 
Gubernatorial and presidential candidates of both major 
1 Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 959 (Alaska 1995) (footnotes omitted). 
2 Frank J. Murray, Court Upholds Drug·Use Eviction, THE WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2002, at Al (Interview with Sheila Crowley of the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition, in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, rejecting an innocent 
landowner defense for the "One Strike and You're Out" housing policy). 
3 See generally JOHN C. CURTIN, 2010: AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 
TwENTY· FIRST CENTURY (1997). Curtin describes the criminalization model's essence 
as social order, whereby "[iJndividuals who exhibit the behaviors regarded as social 
problems are to be contained, repressed, classified for varying degrees of threats to 
public safety and isolated .... " Id. at 2. The American populous is dominated by the 
criminalization movement. Id. at 4. See also NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, THE 
REAL WAR ON CRIME (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996). As a reflection of how obvious the 
crime control phenomenon is, this book opens with "[wJe are a nation both afraid of and 
obsessed with crime." Id. at 1. See also Michele H. Kalstein, et aI., Calculating 
Injustice: The Fixation on Punishment as Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. REV. 
575 (1992). The political crime control policy was preceded by a brief re-integration and 
rehabilitation movement which lasted until the 1970s, where U.S. policy reflected a 
131 
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parties use a "get tough on crime" dialogue as the backdrop of 
their campaigns.4 Stories of violent crime predominate media 
coverage.5 Both voters and legislators, acting upon the "tough 
on crime" jargon and media-saturated violence, have enacted 
habitual offender statutes6 and mandatory mInImUm 
sentencing standards,7 applicable to violent and drug criminals 
alike.8 Lawmakers and criminal justice authorities have 
declared a war on both adults convicted of child abuse9 and 
children themselves. 1o Policy makers have embraced a shift 
away from rehabilitation 11 as a justification for incarceration, 
concern towards assisting ex·offenders. Id. at 591. It is arguable whether this period 
actually had an impact on the well·being of ex·offenders or whether this policy was 
implemented for a long enough period to realistically observe any results. Id. 
4 NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N supra note 3, at 79-80 (noting George Bush 
Sr.'s Willie Horton ad in 1988, William J. Clinton's 1995 ads touting his record on 
crime issues, and George Bush, Jr.'s attack on incumbent Ann Richards for being "soft 
on crime" in the Texas gubernatorial race). 
5 Id. at 68-73. "Coverage of crime on three major network television news shows 
tripled from 571 stories in 1995 to 1632 stories in 1993." Id. at 69 (footnote omitted). A 
study of "ten network and cable channels in 1992 showed 1846 incidents of violence in 
one day." Id. (footnote omitted). Further, "the Annenberg School of Communication at 
the University of Pennsylvania found that seven out of ten prime time shows in the 
past ten years depicted violence." Id. 
6 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (WEST 1999). 
7 See e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2000). The federal sentencing 
guidelines impose zones corresponding with minimum and maximum numerical levels 
for each crime. Id. at § 5C1.1. The numerical value of each crime can be reduced for 
offenders who accept full responsibility for the crime, Id. at §3E1.1, and those who 
substantially assist authorities in the investigation of others, Id. at §5K1.1, in addition 
to mitigating defenses. See e.g., Id. at §5K2 et seq. Judicial discretion does still exist. 
Id. at §5K2. See also Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in 
America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751 (1999). Tonry notes that the new federal sentencing 
guidelines are referred to as "real offense sentencing." Id. at 1756. 
8 See Tonry, supra note 7, at 1756-59 (commenting on real offense sentencing and 
Virginia's sentencing scheme punishing young offenders harsher than their older 
counterparts). 
9 See Thomas D. Larson, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The Dilemma of 
Homeowners and Real Estate Brokers Under Wisconsin's "Megan's Law," 81 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1161, 1162, n.10, (1998) (citing to 39 state statutes requiring community 
notification of sex offenders). 
10 See Tonry supra note 7, at 1759; See also Fox Butterfield, Juvenile Crime Wave 
Triggers Overhaul of Youth Laws in Most States, DENV. POST, May 12, 1996, at A4 
(discussing the possibility of children convicted of certain crimes to be punished as 
adults). 
11 For a detailed explanation of the justifications of punishment, see NORVAL 
MORRIS & DAVID J. ROTHMAN, Introduction to THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: 
THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY IX - XII (Norval Morris & David J. 
Rothman eds., 1995). Morris and Rothman use the term "reformation" in place of 
rehabilitation. Id. at X. The reformation ideal embodies that "[t]he prisoner's time in 
prison should be devoted to fitting him to live a law-abiding life on release." Id. See 
also JOHN IRWIN & JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA'S IMPRISONMENT BINGE 
2
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idealized and attempted in the twentieth century, to 
incapacitation as a justification in and of itself.12 The state of 
California alone allocates more financial resources to the 
construction of prisons than universities. 13 "[T]he United States 
has created the most punitive criminal justice system in the 
modern industrialized world."14 Various correctional staff 
unions and victims' rights groups support even greater 
punishment behind prison walls, such as custodial abuse of 
inmates.l5 The United States is systematically punishing an 
enormous portion of its population at a phenomenal rate. IS The 
punitive wave has washed away all previous justifications for 
punishment.l7 Sovereign states systematically incapacitate 
much of our poor, marginalized and underrepresented 
population. IS 
No area of law has remained untouched by this crime 
control phenomenon.19 Congress and state legislatures have 
64·65 (2nd ed., The Wadsworth Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice Series, 
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1997) (commenting on the demise of rehabilitation). 
12 See generally CURTIN, supra note 3. Curtin notes that incarceration is policy 
while rehabilitation, deterrence, vengeance, retribution, and the like were normative 
goals of punishment rather than actual causes. Id. at 38. These goals are 
rationalizations but should not be mistaken for the cause of incarceration. Id. at 38-
39. 
13 See Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our Devolving 
Standards of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 29 (1998) 
14 Id. at 31. The US competes with South Africa and Russia for the highest 
incarceration rate in the world. Id. at 31, n.19 (citing Prison, Jail Rolls Increase 113% 
in 10 Years, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1996, at A6). 
15 Haney, supra note 13, at 37. 
16 See generally CURTIN, supra note 3, and IRWIN, supra note 11, for discussions on 
the systematic warehousing of America's underclass. These authors advance differing 
definitions and reasons for the warehousing of the underclass. . 
17 Haney, supra note 13, at 27. The title of Haney'S article describes the 
criminalization movement in the United States perfectly. See also Kalstein, supra note 
3. Specifically, the justifications for prison have been specific deterrence (deter the 
individual offender from committing further crime), general deterrence (deter others in 
society from committing that crime), rehabilitation (assist the crime violator in 
becoming a lawful member of society upon release) and incapacitation (removing the 
offender from society to avoid future harm). Id. at 576. Vengeance, not mentioned 
above, is, of course, as active as ever as a moral and emotional incarceration 
justification. See generally CURTIN, supra note 3. 
18 See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text, and IRWIN, supra note 11. 
19 See e.g., Employment Law Seminar, The Regulation of Employee Information in 
the United States, 21 COMPo LAB. L. & POL'y J. 787 (2000) (screening employees for 
criminal records); In re Network Assoc., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 
1999) (district court denies presumptive lead plaintiff under Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I, II), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u- 4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I, II) due in 
part to criminal background). See also John J. Ammann, Criminal Records of the Poor 
and their Effects on Eligibility for Affordable Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
3
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significantly increased "civil disabilities" for ex-offenders 
within the last twenty years.20 Through legislative 
proscriptions, criminal offenders face civil penalties, such as 
the forfeiture of personal and real property used in connection 
with drug offenses.21 In many states, ex-offenders are 
permanently restricted from engaging in various political 
rights, gaining certain professional licenses, and receiving 
social welfare benefits.22 This criminalization movement has 
also influenced the United States judiciary.23 
Public and private landlord-tenant law has accordingly 
been touched by the war on crime.24 Recently, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the "One-Strike and You're Out" 
housin'g policy,25 affording a strict liability eviction of federally 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 222 (2000) (citing individual stories of the difficulties involved in 
getting public housing with a criminal record). 
20 Jeremy Travis, et aI., Prisoner Reentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, 17 CRIM. 
JUST. 12, 16-17 (2002). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using 
Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending 
the Criminal·Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991). 
21 See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 881 (2000) (Federal statute providing types of property that 
can be forfeited if connected with drug crimes); See also Austin v. United States, 113 S. 
Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding that while property used in the facilitation of a crime can be 
forfeited under §881, the forfeiture may be subject to the excessive fines clause of U.S. 
CaNST. amend. VIII). 
22 Cheh, supra note 20, at 1332-48 (discussing these, amongst other, penalties and 
examining the affect on individual civil rights). 
23 See e.g., Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (the United States Supreme 
Court plurality decision with a majority of the justices holding that a sentence of 50 
years to life as adequate under U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII for possession of cocaine); Cf, 
Andrade v. Attorney Gen., 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that California's 
habitual offender statute may be cruel and unusual punishment in certain 
circumstances), cert. granted sub nom. Lockyer v. Andrade, 535 U.S. 969 (2002). 
24 See Parts II - IV infra. See also Robyn Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public 
Housing: The Showdown Between Due Process Rights and Good Management Practice 
in the War on Drugs and Crime, 30 URB. LAW. 573 (1998). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2000) (hereinafter 1996 One Strike). 42 USC § 
1437d(l)(5). In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, providing "any 
member of the [public housing] tenant's household, or a guest or other person under 
the tenant's control shall not engage in criminal activity ... on or near public housing 
premises, while the tenant is a tenant in public housing, and such criminal activity 
shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 § 5101 
(1988) (hereinafter 1988 One Strike). In 1990, Congress enacted the Cranston-
Gonzales Act, providing an expedited grievance procedure for public housing evictions 
relating to " ... any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises ... or any drug·related criminal activity on or near 
such premises .... " Pub. L. No. 101·625, 104 Stat. 4709 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k» 
(1990). Congress enacted the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, 
amending the Anti-Drug Abuse Act's criminal activity eviction clause by replacing "on 
or near" the premises with "on or off' the premises. Pub. L. No. 104·120, 110 Stat. 834 
(1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5». The 1998 Amendment to the Anti-Drug 
4
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subsidized housing tenants should they or their guests commit 
a crime on or off the residential property.26 In his opinion for 
the unanimous court, Chief Justice Rehnquist espoused that 
this type of clause commonly serves as a basis for evictions in 
private leaseholds.27 Civil forfeiture statutes, nuisance 
abatement laws, and the perceived expansion of a landlord's 
tort liability for criminal acts on rental property have 
supported the private landlord's concerns and thus her 
prohibition of ex-offenders as tenants.28 Regulating immoral 
and undesirable behavior is the justification.29 The actual 
result is the removal of the poor from the eyesight of the 
community, at the expense of ideological liberties. 
1. PURPOSE 
This Comment examines the United States Supreme 
Court's statement in The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development v. Rucker30 that a strict liability clause would be 
enforceable in private leases. 31 The Court accordingly infers 
that ex-offenders and suspected offenders would encounter 
obstacles in their attempt to receive and maintain housing 
leases, both public and private. Part II discusses the "One 
Strike and You're Out" housing act32 and the Court's decision 
in Rucker.33 The Court upheld the federally mandated public 
housing strict liability clause in part because the tenant would 
Abuse Act redesignated former paragraph (1)(5) as (1)(6). Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2461 § 512(b)(1)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6» (because no substantial changes to 
the language occurred in 1998, this act will be hereinafter referred to as 1996 One 
Strike). 
26 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S.Ct. 1230 (2002). 
27 Id. at 1235. 
28 See B. A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards 
Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime Committed on the Premise, 42 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 679 (1992). Glesner's article is a detailed and thorough account of lawsuits 
against landlords, which supports the private landlord's perception of expanding 
liability. See also Montgomery L. Effinger, Premises Liability and Owner's Duty: 
Adequate Security for the Enemy Within, 70 N.Y. ST. BAR JOUR. 51 (1998). 
29 See generally Kalstein, supra note 3, at 579-82 (displaying that U.S. policy 
evolved from the utilitarian model of criminal justice and punishment, with the 
purported justifications of punishment as general deterrence (social crime control), 
specific deterrence and incapacitation). 
30 122 S.Ct. 1230 (2002). 
31 Id. at 1235. 
32 1996 One Strike, supra note 25. 
33 122 S.Ct. 1230 (2002). 
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be treated the same in a private lease.34 This Comment thus 
explores the development of both private landlord-tenant law 
and public housing law. 
Part III examines a landlord's procedures for tenant 
selection in private housing leases. Part III compares the legal 
boundaries in private tenant selection with the Congressional 
mandates for tenant screening in public housing leases. Part 
III also displays legal safeguards for the ex-offender who 
believes she has been denied private housing based on her past. 
Part IV discusses the grounds, relating to criminality, upon 
which a private landlord may evict a tenant. Part IV compares 
judicial interpretations of state statutes regulating private 
leases providing for strict liability evictions of tenants for 
criminal acts of guests or third parties, similar to the "One 
Strike and You're Out" policy in public housing. Part V 
examines U.S. ideologies and proposes a model of re-integrative 
housing, using community resources, government, and law, to 
assist ex-offenders in attaining and maintaining their basic 
need of shelter. 
II. BACKGROUND 
One cannot divorce a property law analysis from the effects 
of the criminalization movement. 35 Historically, both Congress 
and state legislatures enacted statutes preventing criminally 
suspect groups from gaining or maintaining private interests in 
land.36 Modernly, local law enforcement agencies board up 
houses where suspected drug trafficking or distribution 
occurs.37 Congress recently gave civil forfeiture laws more 
teeth in an effort to deter owners from allowing their property 
to be used in connection with criminal activity.38 Unlike civil 
forfeiture laws affecting landowners, the public housing lease 
34 Id. at 1235. 
35 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
36 See generally Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien 
Land Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998) (discussing Alien 
Sedition Land Laws aimed at Japanese Americans); Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized 
Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and Beyond, 11 B.D. PUB. INT. L.J. 35 (2001) 
(discussing racialized lending and zoning practices). 
37 See e.g. MD. REAL PROP. § 14-120 (1998); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225 (2000); and 
WASH. STAT. 7.43.010 (1992) (state nuisance abatement statutes). 
38 See generally Andrea M. Jakkola, Civil Forfeiture Reform: The Challenge for 
Congress to Preserve Its Legitimacy While Preventing Its Abuse, 23 J. LEGIS. 93 (1997). 
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provides for a strict liability eviction of a tenant whether or not 
the residential premise was used for the commission of the 
crime or the tenant was connected to the criminality.39 
A. ONE STRIKE AND YOU'RE OUT 
In 1988, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act40 in 
response to its perception of the dramatic boom in public 
housing projects. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act required public 
housing authorities receiving federal funds or assistance to 
include a lease provision stating that criminal activity of a 
tenant, guest or person under the tenant's control is good cause 
for eviction.41 
A new Congress emphasized its unyielding dedication to a 
war on crime in public housing in 1990 with the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Mfordable Housing Act.42 This version of 
the Act reiterated the policy that housing authorities were not 
to tolerate drug or violent criminal activity.43 The Cranston-
Gonzalez Act further stated that "any criminal activity that 
threatens the health, welfare, safety or right to peaceful 
enjoyment" of the premises is grounds for termination.44 
Accelerated administrative grievance procedures for the 
eviction of criminal tenants were also added.45 
In 1996, both Congress and President Clinton gave the 
code more bite by declaring it "One Strike and You're Out."46 
This policy expanded the rights of public housing authorities to 
review tenant files and conduct criminal background screening 
for prospective tenants.47 The Department of Housing and 
39 See 1996 One Strike, supra note 25. 
40 1988 One Strike, supra note 25. See also EJ Hurst II, Note, Rules, Regs, and 
Removal: State Law, Foreseeability, and Fair Play in One Strike Terminations From 
Federally-Subsidized Public Housing, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 737-738 (2000); See also 
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) overruled by Dep't of Hous. and Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S.Ct. 1230 (2002). Judge Michael Daly Hawkins gives a thorough 
account of the legislative history in his subsequently overruled decision. Id. at 1115-
17. 
41 1988 One Strike, supra note 25. 
42 Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4709 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k» (1990); See 
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d at 1115·17, for a thorough legislative history. 
43 See Hurst supra note 40. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996). 
47 See generally Jason Dzubow, Fear-Free Public Housing?: An Evaluation of HUD's 
7
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Urban Development, (hereinafter "HUD") accordingly issued 
"One Strike and You're Out Screening and Eviction Guidelines 
for Public Housing Authorities," outlining the statutory 
language and requiring public housing authorities to screen 
and evict tenants for drug related or "safety threatening" 
behavior.48 Congress and HUD both allowed the public 
housing authorities discretion to consider the totality of 
circumstances when determining whether to evict a tenant. 49 
This legislation, as it reads today, requires public housing 
authorities receiving federal funds to include a clause in leases 
making any drug or violent criminal activity, cause, per se, for 
termination of the tenancy, with little regard for the proximity 
of the activity to the premise.50 Specifically, the Act requires 
the lease provision to: 
provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other 
tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such 
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member 
of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under 
the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy .... 51 
The "One Strike and You're Out" policy is characterized as 
a strict liability law compelling the removal of a tenant's lease 
interest if the public housing authority discovers alleged 
"criminal activity."52 A tenant need not be the alleged 
criminal. 53 Criminal activity of a guest or someone assumed to 
"One Strike and You're Out" Housing Policy, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 55 
(1997). 
48 See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1232·33 
(describing HUD's regulations). 
49 Id. at 1235. The United States Supreme Court focused on the discretion retained 
by the local housing authority: "The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant 
who violated the lease provision .... " Id. (emphasis in original). 
50 See 1996 One Strike, supra note 25; See also S. S.F. Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 41 
Cal. App. 4th Supp. 13, 19 (1995) (holding that "providing a reasonable cause standard 
for eviction that is inconsistent with the cause provisions set out in [One Strike] is 
preempted .... " "[D]rug related activity by any member of a tenant household is cause 
per se for termination of the lease where, as here, the housing authority receives 
federal funds."). 
61 1996 One Strike, supra note 25. 
62 The United States Supreme Court characterized the statute as "strict liability" in 
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1235. 
63 The tenant is responsible for the activities of subtenants, guests or other persons 
under her control. See 1996 One Strike, supra note 25. 
8
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be under the tenant's control is grounds for termination of the 
tenancy. 54 Furthermore, criminal activity by any of these 
persons need not occur on the leased premise.55 The public 
housing authority can thus terminate a tenancy based on 
"criminal activity" by a guest or invitee allegedly committed 
away from the residence even if the tenant doesn't know about 
the activity. 56 Public housing authorities are permitted, 
however, to exercise discretion in the interests of justice.57 
Congress presumptively intended to omit an "innocent 
landowner defense," thus permitting the eviction of a tenant 
who has no knowledge of or connection with the criminal 
activity. 58 The affected and soon to be homeless tenant, who 
neither knows of or has actual control over the acts of this third 
person, has no remedy or defense under "One Strike and You're 
Out."59 Additionally, many critics claim that Congress and 
HUD have created incentives for public housing authorities to 
strictly enforce this act.60 Thus, the public housing authority's 
discretion to consider the circumstances of an unknowing and 
"innocent tenant" is illusory.61 
54 See e.g. Rucker v. Davis, supra note 40, at 1117 (describing Herman Walker, a 
disabled man whom the PHA evicted because his caregiver was caught with cocaine). 
55 See 1996 One Strike, supra note 25 ("on or near the premise."). In Rucker, supra 
note 40, Ms. Rucker was evicted because her daughter was caught with cocaine three 
blocks away from her unit. Id. at 1117. Willie Lee and Barbara Hill, co-plaintiffs of 
Rucker, were evicted because their grandsons were found smoking marijuana in the 
apartment complex parking lot. Id. 
66 See Rucker v. Davis, supra note 40. Ms. Rucker claimed she searched her 
daughter's room for drugs, never found any, and was thus unaware of her daughter's 
drug activity. Id at 1117. 
57 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1235 (discussing local 
PHA discretion). 
58 Id. at 1234 (showing that Congress explicitly placed the innocent landowner 
defense in civil forfeiture and thus intended to omit it from this act). 
59 Id. at 1235. 
60 Incentives being less HUD administrative regulation and more public housing 
authority autonomy. See generally Barclay Thomas Johnson, The Severest Justice is 
Not the Best Policy: The One-Strike Policy in Public Housing, 10 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMM. DEV. L. 234 (2001). Lack of enforcement subjects the public 
housing authority to increased HUD supervision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(1)(I)(3). 
HUD evaluates whether the PHA is troubled from whether it "implements effective 
screening and eviction policies and other anticrime strategies." 42 USC 
1437d(j)(I)(3)(I)(i). If it is troubled, a receiver will be appointed or HUD will "take 
possession of the public housing authority." 42 USC 1437d(j)(3)(B)(ii)(III)(aa)-(bb). See 
generally Barclay Thomas Johnson, The Severest Justice is Not the Best Policy: The 
One-Strike Policy in Public Housing, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMM. DEV. L. 234 
(2001). 
61 See Hurst, supra note 40, at 754-755 (recommending that Congress require 
9
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In the Department of Housing and Urban Development v. 
Rucker,62 the United States Supreme Court upheld the "One 
Strike and You're Out" housing act.63 In Rucker, the Oakland 
Housing Authority evicted tenants who had no knowledge of 
their guest or children's criminal activities.64 The Court relied 
on the express terms of the statute, noting that the statute 
does not explicitly mandate public housing authorities to evict 
an "innocent" tenant.65 Rather, the public housing authority 
retains the discretion under the act to "consider all of the 
circumstances of the case ... " in determining whether to evict.66 
Theoretically, the public housing authority could thus use its 
discretion and allow an innocent tenant to carryon the 
leasehold. 
The unanimous court67 addressed an attack on the statute 
because it lacked an innocent owner defense by comparing the 
"One Strike and You're Out" provision with the civil forfeiture 
statute. 68 Unlike within the "One Strike and You're Out" 
statute, Congress explicitly placed an "innocent owner defense" 
that exempts those who have no knowledge of the criminal 
activity occurring on their land from forfeiture. 69 The Court 
inferred that Congress clearly intended to omit an innocent 
owner defense from the "One Strike" provision. 70 
The Court further found that due process does not protect 
the federally subsidized tenant because the government is 
acting not to " ... criminally punish or civilly regulate [federally 
subsidized tenants] as members of the general populace. 71 It is 
instead acting as a landlord of property that it owns, invoking a 
clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which 
Congress has expressly required."72 The public housing 
PHA's to consider the totality of circumstances in each case). 
62 122 S.Ct. 1230 (2002). 
63 Id. at 1236. 
64 Id. at 1232 (describing the circumstances of Rucker, Hill and Lee); See also supra 
notes 55·57, and accompanying text. 
65 Id. at 1235. 
66 Id. at 1232 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1)(5)(i) (2001». 
67 Id. at 1237 (Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration of these cases). 
68 Id. at 1233·34. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1236. 
72 Id. 
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authority is thus not a state actor for the purpose of invoking 
this lease clause. 
Further, because the tenants agreed to the language and 
knew of the potential for liability, the Court did not find the 
strict liability eviction of a tenant for the acts of third persons 
impermissible. According to the Court in Rucker, "[s]uch 'no 
fault' eviction is a common 'incident of tenant responsibility 
under normal landlord-tenant law and practice."'73 The 
Rucker decision treats the Congressional act as an ordinary 
lease clause and the public housing authority as an ordinary 
landlord.74 Further, the Court makes an underlying 
assumption that because the tenants "agreed" to this lease 
clause, they had a choice to refuse the clause or the housing.75 
The Court, as it would in a private housing situation, enforced 
the terms of the contractual agreement between the Oakland 
Housing Authority and the tenants.76 
The decision in Rucker appears to be based on two theories. 
First, landlord-tenant law in the private sphere, through 
interpretation and enforcement, is similar, if not identical to 
public landlord-tenant law. This theory is apparent through 
the Court's reference to the "One Strike and You're Out" 
provision as "clear," and mutually "agreed" upon by the 
parties.77 Second, the relationship between a public housing 
authority and a federally subsidized tenant is analogous to the 
private landlord-tenant relationship.78 Thus, this Comment 
will examine the development and changes of private landlord-
tenant law to determine whether such a "no-fault eviction" 
clause for criminal would currently be permissible in "normal" 
landlord-tenant law. 
B. LANDLORD-TENANT LAw EVOLUTION 
The origins of landlord-tenant law reflect the disparity of 
wealth and the dependence inherent in the landlord-tenant 
73 [d. at 1235 (citing to 56 Fed.Reg. at 51567). 
74 [d. 
75 Considering the economic situations which bring an individual or family to public 
housing, however, there seems to be little choice or negotiation in the terms of a lease. 
76 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1236. 
77 [d. 
78 Multiple references to the land as the PHA's land, and the PHA as a landlord, 
rather than construing it as a governmental action. [d. at 1230. 
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relationshipJ9 Landlord-tenant relationships developed out of 
an agrarian interest in maintaining productive land and 
gaining an income from production.80 Lords permitted serfs to 
develop and maintain the land, in exchange for "rents," a 
portion of the income the serfs gained from crops.81 Habitation 
on the land was incidental to farming and maintaining the 
land's value and productivity.82 Tenancy at this time was 
considered a status, not a property interest, because the tenant 
"held at the will of the lord with no right to alienate and with 
no right to pass the land on to [her] heirs."83 Thus, the feudal 
lord could evict a serf arbitrarily and a serf could neither 
assign nor sell her property interest.84 Feudal serfs (tenants) 
did not stand on an equal bargaining level with the lords 
(landlords).85 
As landlord-tenant common law developed, courts 
construed the leasehold as a conveyance of land.86 Due to 
economic and social shifts, periodic tenancies and tenancies for 
a term of years became important to lords in an effort to 
maintain the labor force on the land.87 The tenant's right and 
obligation to repair and maintain the land further developed 
into his right to exclusive possession against all others.88 
Courts treated covenants in the lease as independent,89 and 
tenants as their own sovereigns. Caveat emptor dominated the 
landlord-tenant relationship.90 A landlord had no legal duty to 
79 See generally, Honorable Richard Rivera, The Evolution of Landlord & Tenant 
Law: An Overview of Past and Present, 6 PLIINY 7 (1997). 
80 Id. at 15·16. Rivera considers original leaseholds as performing two functions: 
money borrowing devices and labor contracts. Id. at 15. As a money borrowing device, 
tenants worked the land to recover profit, and rents payable to the landlord for use of 
the land. Id. The principle that value was measured by the land's production, and 
thus by the tenant's labor, is embodied by the labor contract aspect. Id. at 16. 
81 Id. 
82 See Irma W. Merrill, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third Parties 
Against Tenants, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431, 433 (1985). 
83 Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law Paradigm for 
Leases Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1563, 1573 (1995); See also 
Rivera, supra note 80, at 14. 
84 Rivera, supra note 80, at 18; Kelley, supra note 84, at 1573. 
85 See Kelley, supra note 84, at 1574 (noting the disparity of wealth in the lord· serf 
relationship). 
86 Id. at 1575·76 (noting that under the common law view, the lease was a 
conveyance). 
87 Rivera, supra note 80, at 16·17. 
88 Id. at 17-18; See also Kelley, supra note 84, at 1575. 
89 Kelley, supra note 84, at 1566. 
90 See Rivera, supra note 80, at 19. 
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repair leased property and the tenant took the land "as is," 
unless the parties explicitly agreed otherwise.91 The tenant's 
covenant to pay rents was independent of the property's 
condition, or any other covenant by the landlord, aside from the 
covenant of quiet enjoyment.92 Thus, if a third party ousted the 
tenant, his obligation to pay rent did not cease.93 
With the onset of industrialization, tenants sought not for 
productive land, but for shelter.94 Caveat emptor was still the 
general policy, however, until the landlord-tenant law 
"revolution" in the 1960's.95 The covenants of the landlord and 
tenant were treated as independent of the other.96 In the 
1960s, courts began applying contract principles to lease 
interpretation, and implied a warranty of habitability and 
construed rent payment covenants as dependant on this 
warranty.97 No longer were tenants the "jack-of-all-trades," 
capable of maintaining the land.98 Rather, due to urban 
industrialization, tenants lived on the land for the sake of their 
off-land jobs.99 The land itself was merely incidental to the 
shelter it provided. lOo Thus, courts began construing the lease 
as a contractual right with dependent promises rather than a 
property interest with independent covenants.101 "[A] property· 
owner's bundle of rights will be confined by the government's 
interest in preserving the health and welfare of its citizens."102 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See Kelley, supra note 83, at 1580-81 (noting that once the landlord "put the 
tenant in actual, lawful possession of the premises ... and thereafter did not disturb the 
tenant's quiet enjoyment ... the tenant's obligation to pay rent became absolute."). See 
also Rivera, supra note 79, at 17-18 (noting that tenants generally did not receive the 
right to recover possession of land from subsequent lessees, or ejectors, until 1235). 
94 Id. at 1576. 
95 See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: 
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 521 (1984). 
96 See Kelley, supra note 84, at 1566. 
97 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970); See 
also Rabin, supra note 96, at 522-26 (discussing the effect of Javins on landlord-tenant 
law). 
98 See Kelley, supra note 84, at 1576; See also Rivera, supra note 80, at 20. 
99 Kelley, supra note 84, at 1576. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law 
that Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681, 718 (1994). 
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The landlord-owner's rights under traditional property law 
have been limited by this revolution.103 No longer can the 
landlord-owner freely determine the amount of rent, select 
tenants without restriction or gain immediate possession when 
the term of the tenancy ends,104 Landlords must now maintain 
minimal standards of health and safety, cleanliness, 
maintenance and fire protection.105 The law has thus placed 
greater liability and responsibility on the landlord than 
historically, 
The "revolution" created by contract law's application to 
lease construction has not erased the landlord's prior 
advantages,l06 The bargaining positions of the parties are still 
favorable to the landlord,107 Landlords typically use form 
leases, without negotiating the particular terms with the 
tenant, lOB The American belief that "If it's my property, I can 
do what I want with it" has not been dismantled,109 Landlords, 
however, are presumably more cautious of the conditions of the 
property and the status of the tenant who therein resides 
because of the fear of potential legal liability, 110 
Many theorize that the civil rights movement and radical 
activism propelled the "revolution" in landlord tenant law of 
the 1960s,111 Both movements influenced the political and 
social elements of property ownership and rights.112 The 
revolution in landlord-tenant law can also be paralelled with 
the great migration of African American ex-sharecroppers into 
cities,113 Just prior to the revolution of landlord tenant law, 
governmental support for the racially aligned undeserving poor 
began,114 Additionally, private and public housing trends were 
influenced by white flight from the cities to the suburbs in the 
\03 See generally Merrill, supra note 83, at 434. 
\04 See generally, Rabin, supra note 96. 
105 Id. 
106 Kelley, supra note 84, at 1577. 
\07 See Javins, supra note 97, at 1079 (noting the unequal bargaining power and the 
commonality of form leases); See also Green, supra note 103, at 712. 
\08 Javins., supra note 97, at 1079. 
109 See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 283 (1998). 
110 See generally B. A. Glesner, supra note 28. 
111 See Rabin, supra note 96, at 546-48. 
112 See Green, supra note 103, at 705-07. 
113 See generally, Troy Duster, Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the 
California Strategy, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Robert Post 
& Michael Rogin eds., 1998). 
114 Green, supra note 103, at 688. 
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wake of desegregation, the National Housing Act, and 
racialized zoning and lending practices encouraged by local and 
federal housing authorities. 115 This racially defined, lower 
economic class population coincidentally contributes largely to 
the United States' present prison population.116 
C. PUBLIC HOUSING EXPANSION 
Public housing was created to assist a temporarily weak 
population. ll7 During the Great Depression, the many families 
who lost their financial stability were characterized as the 
undeserving poor.118 Today, due to social and economic shifts 
on federal and local levels, public housing no longer houses 
those for whom it was created.119 Further, the central power 
apparently does not view housing this particular population as 
its responsibility or concern.120 
Both the legislative and executive branches attempted to 
appease this group of undeserving poor by creating 
governmental subsidies for housing, among other benefits. 121 
The central government espoused that the public housing 
would not compete with housing and business in the private 
sector.l22 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal 
legislation was "designed to provide a 'floor of protection for the 
industrial working class, ... .'''123 Pursuant to the United 
States Housing Act of 1937, the federal government seized land 
and developed twenty thousand housing units in urban areas 
115 Duster, supra note 113, at 117; See also Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (plaintiffs sued suburban city because they believed the 
zoning ordinance that prohibited development of low-income housing was race-based). 
116 Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Ph.D., Prisoners in 2001, Bulletin, 
Washington, DC: U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Bureau of Just. Stat., July 2002, NCJ 195189 
(reports that 10% African American men, ages 25-29, are incarcerated). 
117 See Michelle Adams, Separate and {UnJequal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and 
Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 436-
39 (1996). 
118 Green, supra note 103, at 688. 
119 See [d. at 686-92. 
120 Adams, supra note 118, at 438-39 (one merely needs to look at the construction of 
housing since the migration of African Americans to the cities). 
121 See Green, supra note 103, at 690. 
122 [d.; Of course, in reality, public housing does compete with private housing. 
Interview with Professor Roger Bernhardt, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University, 
in San Francisco, Cal. (July 20, 2002). 
123 See Duster, supra note 114, at 117. 
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to accommodate the former middle class undeserving poor.124 
Mter such federal takings were held unconstitutional, 125 local 
public housing authorities were established to regulate these 
urban housing developments and land seizures.126 
Housing problems existed prior to the Great Depression 
and the New Deal legislation that created public housing. 127 
Historians and legal theorists have written extensively on over-
crowded and expensive "black belts" and deteriorated yet 
inhabited tenement buildings.l28 The impetus for the creation 
of this legislation, however, was the new population enduring 
social and economic crisis.129 
Mter the New Deal legislation and federal funding revived 
the economy, the middle class resumed its previous position, 
but not the previous housing. 13o Veterans, returning from 
World War II, subsequently laid their claims to public housing 
during the 1940'S.131 This population " ... forced the adoption of 
an aggressive strategy to remove the revived middle class from 
public housing, where it had grown comfortable and wanted to 
remain. "132 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Mrican American migrant 
population flooded northern urban areas, and thus public 
housing projects.l33 In accordance with law and social practice 
at this time, however, this group did not generate the 
sympathy that the undeserving poor received. 134 Suburban 
areas resisted public housing developments with Mrican 
Americans. 135 Public Housing Authorities, who largely 
124 See Adams, supra note 118, at 433-34. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 434. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 431·36. 
130 See Green, supra note 103, at 691. 
131 [d. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 691·92. 
134 Id. at 692. Looking back, one cannot deny the racist law existent until the 1960's 
civil rights movement; interracial marriage was prohibited in many states, poll taxes 
were specially enforced, schools and public facilities were segregated. 
135 See Duster, supra note 113, who explains the circumstances surrounding white 
flight to the suburbs and realtor, broker and governmental resistance to allowing 
blacks into the suburbs. Id. at 119. Ironically, this occurred and was maintained 
during and after the "civil rights movement" which makes many wonder whether the 
civil rights movement was actually effective. Id. at 122. 
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nurtured this resistance,136 redeveloped urban areas and 
created high-rise housing projects, still visible and operating 
today.137 
HUD and local housing authorities primarily assist 
families whose income is less than 30% the area median 
income.138 Hud, however, estimates that public housing 
programs meet the needs of less than 17% of those eligible for 
assistance. 139 The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility 
Act of 1998140 purports to transfer the power of regulating 
public housing from the federal government to the local 
housing authorities. 141 Public housing authorities must 
conform with federal housing regulations, including criminal 
screening and "One Strike and You're Out," to receive federal 
funding. 142 
III. THE PROBLEMS OF "CRIMINALS" ATTAINING HOUSING 
In 1999, over 600,000 prison inmates were released onto 
the streets. 143 Those released on parole receive some 
136 See e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); See generally, Duster, supra 
note 113. 
137 For a really devastating look at the high rise housing projects, look at The 
Chicago Housing Authority and the American Dream, available at 
www.Columbia.edul-sk652/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). "Ironically, the 
massive Robert Taylor Homes, consisting of 28 identical sixteen-story buildings, 
virtually guaranteed racial segregation because it was built in the middle of the 
redeveloped slums of the Black Belt, thus keeping its over 28,000 residents isolated 
within the South-Side." Id. While the Chicago Housing Authority, under the direct 
supervision of HUD, is condemning these ghastly buildings to build more adequate 
public housing, most are still present and inhabited today. Id. 
138 See National Low Income Housing Coalition, Public Housing, in 2001 
ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.nlihc.org/advocates/publichousing.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (40% of 
new admissions to public housing must have incomes less than 30% the area median 
income). 
139 See Otto J. Hetzel, Asserted Federal Devolution of Public Housing Policy and 
Administration: Myth or Reality, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 415, 421 (2000); See also 
Michael D. Weiss & Lauri Thanheiser, Helter Shelter: The {DisJorganization of Public 
Housing Policy, 51 WASH. UNIV. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 189, 196 (1997). 
140 Classified generally as 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. 
141 See Hetzel, supra note 139, at 415-16. 
142 Hetzel, supra note 139, at 441. 
143 See generally Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, 
Economic, and Social Consequences, in SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY, WHEN PRISONERS RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY, at 1 (U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUST., Nat'l Inst. of Just., Nov. 2000). 
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assistance in finding employment and housing,144 Considering 
the enormous caseloads of parole officers, however, the 
effectiveness of this assistance is questionable. 145 
Additionally, fourteen states have completely abolished parole. 
146 Other states, such as California, have not abolished parole 
in its entirety, but instead have coupled minimal parole 
supervision with determinant sentencing.147 Further, prisons 
generally do not offer pre-release assistance to inmates soon to 
be released and in need of housing. 148 If support is afforded, 
prison officials do not feel responsible for assisting these people 
with finding housing. 149 A majority of the offender population 
is thus left without resources for obtaining housing or 
employment upon their release from jailor prison.150 
Acquisition of adequate housing affects whether these 
persons will re-offend.151 According to a United Kingdom study, 
two-thirds of offenders without satisfactory accommodation re-
offend within twelve months after release.152 In contrast, only 
one-fourth of ex-offenders who attain adequate housing re-
offend within· the same time period.153 It appears that 
domestic stability is necessary for an ex-offender to re-integrate 
and become a lawful and productive member of society. 154 
In light of the "One Strike and You're Out" public housing 
law, many ex-offenders will not receive governmentally 
subsidized housing.155 Private, unsubsidized housing may 
144 Id. at 3 (describing some parole officer duties). 
145 Id. at 3. 
146 Id. at 2 (stating that automatic mandatory release has replaced discretionary 
sentencing and supervised release in 14 states). 
147 Id. at 2 (noting that in California, parole supervision is usually one year, and 
supervision has replaced services). 
148 Travis, supra note 20, at 14. 
149 Id. 
150 Petersilia, supra note 143, at 3·5. 
151 CTR. FOR HOus. POLICY, THE HOUSING NEEDS OF EX-PRISONERS (1996), available 




164 Id. See also Owen Covington, Ex-offenders Seek Second Chance, High Point 
Enterprise, available at http://www.hpe.com/2001/01l02/news/102news8.html (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2003). 
155 LEGAL ACTION CENTER, HOUSING LAwS AFFECTING INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS (2000), available at 
http://www.enterprisefoundation.org/model%20documents/1150 (last visited Feb. 16, 
2003). 
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present the only opportunity for social integration of these ex-
offenders.156 If lease clauses analogous with "One Strike and 
You're Out" are typical and legally enforceable in private 
housing, the 600,000 ex-offenders released from prison this 
year will have nowhere to turn but to the streets, to crime, and 
back to prison. 157 
IV. TENANT SCREENING 
Tenants with past criminal offenses are prevented from 
obtaining leases or residing within public or federally 
subsidized housing. 15s The public housing authorities look at 
the criminal history of every housing applicant as well as each 
member of the housing applicant's immediate family to 
determine whether the persons will be suitable tenants. 159 
Each applicant signs a waiver allowing the housing authority 
to access this information.l60 If the housing authority 
determines that the past criminal behavior may adversely 
affect the health, safety or welfare of other tenants, or the 
housing project, the housing authority may reject the 
applicant.16l The housing authority need not show that an 
individual applicant was actually convicted of criminal 
activities to deny the applicants access to public housing. 162 
The housing authority only needs to show that the applicant 
has "engaged in" such activity.163 Thus, those with criminal 
histories, such as convictions, past arrests or past bad acts, will 
likely be barred from receiving any benefit from federally 
subsidized housing. 164 
Unlike public housing authorities and landlords who 
accept federal funds, a private landlord is not required to 
screen potential tenants.l65 A landlord, however, may be 
156 However, as noted in Covington's article, supra note 153, it is difficult to convince 
private landlords to rent to ex-offenders. 
157 See Petersilia, supra note 143, at 5. 
158 See Travis, supra note 20, at 17. 
159 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (2000). 
160 Id. at § 1437d(s) 
161 See Johnson, supra note 61, at 239-40. 
162 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(t)(3)(B) (2000). 
163 Id. 
164 See supra notes 159-164. 
165 See generally Shelley Ross Saxer, ''Am I My Brother's Keeper?':' Requiring 
Landowner Disclosure of the Presence of Sex Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 
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potentially liable for criminal acts committed by tenants 
against other tenants. A landlord may also be concerned with 
potential governmental forfeiture for properties used for illegal 
purposes, and drug nuisance abatement statutes. Thus, a 
private landlord may be fearful of the possibility of litigation 
and believe she has greater reason to screen and investigate 
housing applicants. 166 
A. PRIVACY INTERESTS 
State and federal law govern who may access criminal 
offense records.l67 Generally, states consider facts concerning 
arrests and convictions public record.l68 The common law 
recognized that the individual's right "to determine the extent 
he wishes to share himself with others,"169 or to "control the 
dissemination of information about himself'170 should not be 
distorted simply because the information is considered public 
record.l71 Congressional statutes and United States Supreme 
Court's decisions, however, have followed a narrow 
interpretation of the individual's interest in preventing 
dissemination of past criminal acts to the public, in favor of 
society's interest in obtaining such information.l72 
There is no explicit right to privacy in the United States 
Constitution.173 The Bill of Rights has "penumbras, formed by 
emanations" surrounding express rights and guarantees, which 
NEB. L. REV. 522, 561-69(2001). 
166 [d. 
167 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2002). 
168 See e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no constitutional privacy right 
affected by publication of name of arrested but untried shoplifter); See also Robert R. 
Stauffer, Note, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening Services and the Right to 
Privacy, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239 (1987); See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203d (2002). 
169 U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749,764 n.16 (1989). 
170 [d. 
171 Even within the common law paradigm, however, many recognized that few facts 
about an individual's life are actually secret. [d. at 763 n.14. Thus, as Karst, 
commented, a "[mjeaningful discussion of privacy ... requires the recognition that 
ordinarily we deal not with an interest in total nondisclosure but with an interest in 
selective disclosure." [d. (citing Kenneth L. Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the 
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 
343-44 (1966». 
172 See infra Part V.A. 
173 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965). 
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create a zone of privacy.l74 One type of privacy interest 
recognized by courts is the individual's interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.175 
The United States Supreme Court has considered this 
issue in the context of tort liability for those who disclose and 
publish personal matters, such as criminal history, and 
whether an individual has a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest in her criminal historyP6 The Court weighs the 
privacy interest of the individual against the public's interest 
in both acquiring this information and observing the judicial 
process.177 The Court has found that crime, prosecutions and 
judicial proceedings "are without question events of legitimate 
concern to the public ... of critical importance to our type of 
government .... "178 
In Paul v. Davis,179 police chiefs distributed a flyer of 
"active shoplifters," which included an individual who had been 
arrested, but not convicted, for shoplifting.180 The individual 
brought suit against the police under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for 
violating his penumbral right to privacy, for disclosing the facts 
of his arrest on the shoplifting charge.l81 The United States 
Supreme Court held that facts surrounding an arrest, an 
official act, do not fall within the zone of privacy protected by 
the Constitution.182 An Illinois state court in Jones v. Taibbi 183 
echoed the opinions of both the Supreme Court in Paul and 
many state courts in finding that an ex-offender has no 
protected right in maintaining the privacy of her criminal 
records. 184 In accordance with the concern of public access to 
the judicial and criminal process, legislative initiatives such as 
Megan's law, requiring sex offenders to register with the police 
174 [d. at 484. 
175 Whalen v. Roe, 439 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). 
176 See Paul v. Davis, supra note 169; See also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469 (1975). 
177 See id. at 490·92. 
178 [d. at 492. 
179 424 U.S. 693 (1976) 
180 [d. at 713. 
181 [d. at 696·97. 
182 [d. at 713. 
183 512 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 1987). 
184 [d. at 269· 70 (arrest and criminal record are part of the public record). 
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departments for the cities in which they live, have buttressed 
these federal and state courts' opinions.185 
California courts have construed the right to privacy under 
the California Constitution as broader than the federal courts' 
interpretation of the right to privacy under the federal 
constitution.186 California courts found that the ex-offender's 
privacy interest may outweigh the public interest in an 
individual's criminal history, where a conviction or arrest is 
remote.187 In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.,188 a 
California court found that an individual with an eleven-year-
old arson conviction might have a privacy interest in keeping 
the criminal record private.189 While the court found that 
present criminal activities are "the legitimate province of a free 
press,"190 a publishing company, or another private party who 
publicly disseminates remote criminal activities, can be held 
liable for a tort action.191 Although the California view that a 
remote felony may be entitled to privacy is in the minority, this 
view protects the interests of a felon with a remote conviction. 
192 
The United States Supreme Court has also considered to 
what extent the Freedom of Information Act allows 
government-compiled criminal information to be disclosed to a 
private individual or the public.193 The Freedom of Information 
Act (hereinafter "FOIA") prohibits the revelation of certain 
information to the public.194 For example, the government may 
withhold information and documents compiled "for law 
enforcement purposes" to the extent that "the production of 
such records would ... constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy. "195 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
185 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (2000). 
186 See eg., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (1971). 
187 [d. at 41. 
188 483 P.2d 34 (1971). 
189 [d. at 41. 
190 [d. at 39. 
191 [d. at 43. 
192 See e.g., Baker v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978); Roshto v. 
Hebert, 439 So.2d 428 (La. 1983); Faloona by Fredrickson v. Hustler Magazine, 607 F. 
Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985). 
193 U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra 
note 170. 
194 [d. at 755-56. 
195 [d. 
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a vast compilation of criminal "rap sheets" which could 
potentially be released to third persons under the FOIA unless 
protected by this exception.l96 The Court found, however, that 
the disclosure of these records to private individuals was not 
what the FOIA framers intended, and thus, these records are 
protected under this exception.197 The Court, however, made 
clear that this opinion had no bearing on whether an individual 
can bring a tort action for criminal record disclosure or whether 
the constitution embraced past criminal records within the 
"zone of privacy. "198 
While a private landlord would not be permitted to request 
an FBI rap sheet on a tenant applicant, there is nothing 
prohibiting the landlord from researching and collecting this 
information on her own.l99 Additionally, should a landlord do 
the footwork and retrieve the criminal information, no 
guidelines exist which prevent her from considering even a 
remote offense as part of the ex-offender's rental application.20o 
Some commentators have noted that a landlord may disclose 
this information if they determine that the information is 
truthful, the ex-offender has not been rehabilitated, and it is 
disclosed to warn someone for whom the landlord owes a 
duty.201 The landlord alone, however, has the discretion to 
determine the above factors. 
B. TENANT SCREENING AGENCIES 
More and more frequently, landlords hire tenant-screening 
agencies to review the histories of housing applicants. 202 A 
typical tenant-screening agency collects and disseminates 
credit history information about the prospective tenant.203 This 
information includes whether the tenant has ever been the 
196 Id. at 752-53. 
197 Id. at 780. 
198 Id. at 763 n.13. 
199 Id. at 763-64. 
200 California does preclude the use of past convictions as a basis for denying rental 
applications; see CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12955.3 (2000). 
201 See Saxer, supra note 166, at 562-64. 
202 See Stauffer, supra note 169, at 241. 
203 Id. at 240. 
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subject of a formal complaint or been involved many 
litigation.204 
Generally, there are three types of tenant screenmg 
agencies: those maintaining public records, financial 
information, or lifestyle information.205 The public records 
agency compiles information generally accessible to the 
public.206 Particularly, this agency finds information about the 
tenant's involvement in legal disputes. 207 Usually, this agency 
does not research surrounding facts of the litigation or convey 
the outcome of these disputes.208 These reports will not 
indicate whether the tenant was the prevailing party.209 
The financial agency discovers and conveys the financial 
information of a tenant applicant, just as one would expect 
from a credit-reporting agency.210 This report normally 
accounts for the tenant's bill paying habits, bank accounts, 
outstanding creditors, occupation, and income.211 
The. tenant agencies reporting on a tenant's lifestyle 
collects a broader amount of information and detail than the 
other two agencies.212 These agencies will hire private 
investigators to gather information ranging from the tenant's 
martial status to the tenant's general reputation among 
acquaintances.213 
The typical tenant screening agency does not actively 
collect and compile criminal data, because their main purpose 
is to inform the landlord about the financial capabilities of the 
prospective tenant.214 Through both the public records and 
lifestyle investigations, however, tenant-screening agencies 
would likely find a past criminal conviction and report it to the 
landlord.215 Fortunately, these agencies are regulated by the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act and thus must keep the information 
204 Gary Williams, Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 
1077, 1079 (1995). 
205 Stauffer, supra note 169, at 242·43. 
206 [d. 
207 [d. at 242. 
208 [d. 
209 [d. at 244 
2\0 [d. at 243 
211 [d. 
212 [d. at 244 
213 [d. 
214 [d. 
215 [d. at 242·45. 
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they disseminate accurate.216 Should the tenant-screening 
agency mis-inform the landlord about an individual's criminal 
past, they may be subject to tort liability.217 
Certain tenant screening agencies would not actively 
pursue information about an applicant's past criminal 
history.218 An ex-offender, or someone only recently released 
from prison, however, has most likely not maintained bill 
payments, rents or credit cards. This individual would have 
either a gap in credit history, during the period of 
incarceration, or accumulated multiple debts from years of 
unpaid and unaccounted for bills. In any event, the tenant-
screening agency would discover such a credit gap or record of 
delinquency, and the landlord would likely reject this 
candidate.219 
C. OTHER SCREENING CONSIDERATIONS 
A non-offender may be excluded from housing leases if she 
answers incriminating questions a landlord may legally ask. 
Legislative policies waging a war on drug use have curtailed 
anti-discrimination laws governing tenant selection.220 A 
landlord can ask whether an applicant is currently using 
drugs, or has used drugs within the last year.221 Additionally, 
the landlord may inquire whether the tenant applicant has 
ever been convicted of manufacturing or distributing drugs.222 
The landlord should, however, ask all the prospective tenants 
the same questions should she want to avoid the appearance of 
discrimination.223 
The landlord may subconsciously weigh a number of 
factors to determine whether the applicant is likely to commit a 
216 Id. at 251. 
217 See generally Williams, supra note 205; Stauffer, supra note 169. 
218 Stauffer, supra note 169, at 250. 
219 Id. at 251. 
220 CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12955.3 (2000) (prohibits considering past drug crimes, but 
not drug use within the last year). 
221 See David Lang, Note, Get Clean or Get Out: Landlords Drug-Testing Tenants, 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 459, 464-65 n.34 (2000) (citing to United States v. Southern 
Mgmt, Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1992». 
222 Id. Lang displays that under the Fair Housing Act, the term "disability" does not 
embrace current drug use. Id. at 464-65. He also notes that the Fair Housing Act does 
not prevent a landlord from refusing to rent to a tenant convicted of manufacturing or 
distributing a controlled substance. Id. at 465. 
223 Id. 
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crime. The landlord's biases regarding race, age or sex may 
contribute to the selection process without any overt signals or 
telling questions. Federal and local civil rights laws prohibit 
consideration of these protected characteristics. 224 
Determining whether a landlord considered these factors is 
difficult. 225 The credibility of an ex-offender may be 
questionable when balanced against that of an established and 
respected landlord.226 
More frequently, landlords can find local or state 
legislative support for denying an individual housing based 
entirely on a past offense.227 In Georgia, the Farmers Home 
Administration regulation authorizes landlords to reject 
tenants who may pose a direct threat to the safety or health of 
others.228 This act regulates residential units designated as 
"low-income." 229 Landlords have used this act as the basis of 
disapproving any residential lease application filed by certain 
violent felons. 23o While this particular act does not require 
landlords to reject such applications, landlords have used this 
act to expand exclusionary policies to all convicted felons. 231 
Further, property owners associations, or homeowners 
associations, have amended their covenants and restrictions to 
prohibit property owners from selling or leasing to sex 
offenders.232 The homeowners associations rely on the 
assumption that the individual convicted of sex offenses poses a 
risk to the community due to the probability of future 
offenses.233 Courts have upheld these amendments even 
though they arguably limit the property owner's right to sell or 
lease her property.234 Considering that courts have upheld 
224 See Federal Fair Housing Act of 1937, 12 U.S.C. § 4545 (2000); California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOVT CODE § 12940 (2000). 
225 See Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and 
Beyond, 11 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 35, 43 (2001). 
226 FED.R. EVID. 609(a)(1)-(2). 
227 See Stephens v. Greensboro Properties, Ltd., 544 S.E.2d 464 (Ga. 2001); See also 
Collins v. AAA Homebuilders, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 792 CW. Va. 1985) (holding that a 
landlord may deny housing to a tenant with a prior conviction). 
228 Stephens, supra note 227, at 469. 
229 Id. at 466. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Assoc., 766 A.2d 1186, 1189 (N.J. 
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such amendments prohibiting leases with sex offenders, it is 
possible that homeowners associations may amend their 
covenants to prohibit leases with all ex-offenders. 
V. GROUNDS FOR EVICTION 
Once the ex-offender has entered into a lease, or if the ex-
offender has maintained housing while incarcerated, a landlord 
may attempt to evict the ex-offender and her family.235 The 
landlord's grounds for eviction may be based on state 
statutes236 or terms within the lease. In the following sections, 
both will be examined, with a particular emphasis on the 
statutory grounds for eviction. In both cases, as with the issue 
in Rucker, courts generally favor the plain language of either 
the statute or the lease terms, unless the language is 
ambiguous. The courts profess that the public policy, however, 
is against forfeiture of a tenancy.237 Thus, courts strictly 
construe the terms of the lease or the statute at issue.238 
A. USE OF PREMISE FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSE 
Many statutes provide for the forfeiture or termination of a 
lease due to a tenant's illegal use of the premises.239 A New 
York ordinance stated that a lease would become void if the 
tenant "uses or occupies the premises for any illegal trade, 
manufacture or other business."24o Statutes like this do not 
explicitly define what constitutes an illegal trade, manufacture 
or other business.241 Other states, such as Massachusetts, 
specify the illegal uses for which the landlord may evict the 
tenant.242 Examples of illegal uses under the Massachusetts 
statute are gaming, lottery, prostitution, and lewdness.243 
Where a statute explicitly provides the particular 
prohibited illegal use, the tenant must have engaged in that 
235 See infra. 
236 New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000). 
237 190 Stanton Inc. v. Santiago, 302 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969). 
238 [d. 
239 See Glesner, supra note 111, at 776. 
240 See Santiago, supra note 237, at 694. 
241 [d. at 695. 
242 Roseman v. Day, 185 N.E.2d 650,652 (Mass. 1962). 
243 [d. 
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particular prohibited conduct in order to form the basis of an 
eviction.244 In Roseman v. Day,245 a landlord attempted to evict 
a tenant under a Massachusetts statute that expressly set 
forth five specific grounds for an illegal use eviction.246 The 
tenant, however, was accused of selling harmful narcotic drugs, 
an activity not then enumerated in the statute.247 The court 
found that the landlord could not invoke the statute to void the 
lease. 248 
Courts have defined an illegal "use" of the premises must 
amount to more than isolated incidents of criminality on the 
premises.249 To constitute an illegal use of the premises, the 
use must be of a continuing nature or customary character.25o 
The term "use" cannot be construed to include an isolated 
act.251 Rather, "use" implies the doing of something 
customarily or habitually upon the premise.252 
Courts agree that no matter what the nature of the use, 
isolated or continued, the illegal activity under such statutes 
must actually occur upon the demised premise to constitute 
grounds for eviction under an illegal use statute.253 
Accordingly, prior to the decision in Rucker, federal courts of 
appeal found that voiding a lease for crimes that occurred off 
the public housing premise was contrary to the statutory 
prohibition of unreasonable lease terms.254 While this 
reasoning has not maintained its weight in public housing 
lease interpretation since Rucker, courts may continue to 
construe private leases in this manner. 
Many states with statutes that articulate the specific 
grounds for eviction have subsequently included drug use or 
possession as an illegal use of the premise.255 For example, a 
244 Id. 
245 185 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1962). 
246 Id at 652 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 See 190 Stanton Inc. v. Santiago, supra note 237, at 695. 
250 Id. 
251 Id.; See also Glesner, supra note 111, at 776·77. 
252 See e.g., U.C.L. Realty Co. v. Brown, 84 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1948). 
253 See e.g., 1895 Grand Concourse Assoc. v. Ramos, 685 N.Y.S.2d 580, 583 (1998). 
254 See e.g., Tyson v. N.Y. City Rous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
255 See generally D.E Evins, Annotation, Construction and Application of Statute 
Autlwrizing Forfeiture or Termination of Lease Because of Tenant's Jllega( Use of 
Premises, 100 A.L.R.2d 465 (1965). 
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Massachusetts statute now explicitly includes as grounds for 
eviction, drug possession, or other criminal drug charges, 
where the tenant is arrested or suspected of conducting illegal 
activity on the premise.256 
Due to heightened communal concerns regarding drug 
trafficking and use,257 states and localities frequently require 
landlords to evict tenants for criminal activities on the 
premises through nuisance abatement statutes.258 These 
statutes declare nuisances "certain property, including 
privately owned residential buildings, used for the purpose of 
illegally administering, manufacturing, distributing, or storing 
controlled dangerous substances or paraphernalia."259 The 
statutes authorize certain persons, including the city or county 
attorney, to bring an action to abate the nuisance.26o Once the 
court has declared the property a nuisance, courts will grant 
relief (or abate the nuisance) by requiring the tenant with 
knowledge of the particular criminal activity to vacate the 
property.261 In Massachusetts, for example, the nuisance 
statute makes it a crime for a landlord who knows or has 
reason to know that the tenant is engaging in the prohibited 
activity to allow it to continue.262 Upon receiving notice from 
the county or the court that the tenant is using the property for 
illegal purposes, the landlord may also be criminally liable if 
she does not take all reasonable measures to legally evict the 
tenant.263 Thus, the central governmental authority has the 
power to step in where it feels that an owner has not 
adequately prevented criminal uses on the rental property. 
B. LANDLORD LIABILITY FOR DISCOVERY OF CRIMINAL 
PROPENSITIES 
A landlord may have grounds for eviction where she 
subsequently discovers that the tenant has a criminal record or 
256 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 139, § 19 (West 2002). 
257 See Martin v. Howard County, 667 A.2d 992, 993 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). 
258 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.5317 (West 1987); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 139, § 
19 (West 2002). 
259 See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14·120 (1996). 
260 Martin, supra note 258, at 993·94. 
261 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-120(t)(1) (1996). 
262 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 139, § 20 (West 2002). 
263 Id.; See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.5317 (West 1987). 
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a history of criminal acts.264 Some commenters assert that the 
landlord owes a duty to other tenants if the landlord knows of 
the tenant's criminal propensities.265 Thus, the landlord may 
arguably have a duty to evict a tenant for the tenant's past 
criminal behavior.266 
Recently, tenant initiated lawsuits against landlords for 
criminal activities on the premises have become more and more 
frequent.267 The general rule is that a residential landlord has 
no duty to police the premise.268 Depending on the 
circumstances, however, some courts find landlords liable to 
the tenant for the criminal acts on the premise.269 
In construing whether a landlord has a duty to her tenants 
for criminal acts on the premise, courts employ contract or tort 
principles.270 Using contract principles, courts have implied a 
warranty of security when landlords provided security 
measures at the beginning of the tenancy and yet failed to 
maintain them.271 Nevertheless, courts are reluctant to find 
landlords liable for criminal activities where there are no 
express lease terms stating that the landlord shall provide 
security on the premise.272 
Through the use of tort law, courts require evidence that 
the criminal conduct was foreseeable to the landlord.273 Thus, 
the court examines factors to determine foreseeability, such as 
the proximity of past criminal activities, whether the other 
criminal acts are recent, the similarity between the past 
criminal acts and the present act, and whether the past 
criminal acts were publicized.274 Nonetheless, courts generally 
find that a landlord does not owe a duty to protect tenants from 
criminal attacks unless the landlord created the risk or was 
264 See Effinger, supra note 28,at 52·53. 
265 Id. 
266 See Glesner, supra note 28, at 709-16. 
267 Id.; See also Merrill, supra note 83, at 431. 
268 See Glesner, supra note 28, at 709-16. 
269 See e.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956) as an 
example of one of the earlier cases holding a landlord liable for an attack on the 
residential premise. 
270 See e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (tort) 
and Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F.Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980) 
(contract). 
271 See Flood, supra note 270. 
272 See Sciascia v. Riverpark Apts., 444 N.E.2d 40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). 
273 See Timberwalk Apts. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749,755 (Tex. 1998). 
274 Id. at 759. 
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responsible for a known physical condition that created the 
risk. 275 While courts have generally rejected both tort and 
contract theories as a basis for tenant lawsuits against 
landlords for criminal acts committed by other tenants, 
nonetheless, landlords have become more cautious of whom 
they accept and reject as tenants.276 
Further, some courts have found that the landlord may 
have a duty to evict the criminal tenant if the tenant's past 
behavior or offenses reflect or indicate the possibility of future 
activities that may threaten the health or welfare of other 
tenants.277 As with the criminal acts committed against 
tenants due to residential security issues mentioned above, 
courts have found that a landlord can only be found liable for 
the criminal acts of tenants if the landlord had reason to 
foresee the criminal conduct.278 Accordingly, courts have 
determined that possible or supposed future criminal conduct 
does not establish the landlord's duty.279 If the landlord 
discovers that the tenant has a criminal past, a court may 
nevertheless construe that a criminal offender tenant's 
subsequent crime was foreseeable to the landlord because of 
the tenant's past criminal offenses.28o 
Unless a state or local statute provides that a landlord may 
evict based on the tenant's criminal past, the landlord may be 
liable for an unlawful eviction if she decides to evict the tenant 
because she subsequently discovers the tenant's prior criminal 
history.281 As discussed above, however, the potential for 
landlord liability for the criminal acts of her tenants is 
minimal.282 Further, the ex-offender tenant is far less likely to 
re-offend than her homeless counterpart.283 Thus, the landlord 
has little actual reason to evict the ex-offender tenant. 
275 See Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., Inc., 633 A.2d 103, 107 (N.H. 1993). 
276 See generally Effinger, supra note 28. 
277 [d. (showing New York court determinations). 
278 [d.; See also Merrill, supra note 83, at 444·46. 
279 See e.g., Cain, supra note 273, at 759; C{. Walls, supra note 273, at 107 (rejecting 
landlord liability based solely on foreseeability). 
280 See Effinger, supra note 28, at 52. 
281 [d. 
282 See generally Glesner, supra note 28 (discussing how the liability has not 
expanded, but may expand). 
283 See Part III, supra. 
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C. FAMILY AND GUEST RAMIFICATIONS 
Many recently released ex-offenders live with their 
families. 284 In the case of public housing, as reflected by the 
Rucker decision, the tenant family may be subject to eviction by 
the housing authority if the ex-offender family member's crime 
is perceived as a threat to the "health, welfare or safety" of the 
housing project.285 The public housing authority may prohibit 
the tenant family from providing housing for the ex-offender 
family member. Additionally, in the public housing realm, the 
tenant family bears the risk of a strict liability eviction if the 
ex-offender does re-offend.286 
Private housing leases are not subject to the "One Strike 
and You're Out" housing policy.287 Because many courts now 
construe leases through contract principles, and the ideal of 
negotiating the terms of the lease, however, landlords can place 
such a clause in the lease.288 For those landlords who do not 
place such a restriction in the terms of the lease, they can find 
statutory grounds for eviction through state law.289 Some 
states have enacted legislation similar to the "One Strike and 
You're Out" policy, applicable to both public and private 
housing.290 Many state courts, however, rely on the ideal of the 
landlord and tenant negotiating the terms of the lease, in equal 
bargaining positions. 
The court relied on the "agreed upon terms between 
parties" and refused to imply an "innocent owner" defense in 
the old case of Bel-Clark Building Corporation u. Glauner.291 
The court found the express terms of the lease governed 
whether a tenant could be evicted for the criminal acts of his 
284 See Joan Petersilia, Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in California, in 
C.P.R.C. BRIEF 12, (Cal. Policy Res. Ctr. 2000) at 3 (recently released ex-offenders 
reside with their families and, when familial resources are exhausted, they become 
homeless). 
285 See Part III, supra. 
286 See generally, Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26. 
287 For the purposes of this comment, private housing is that housing where neither 
the tenant nor the landlord receives federal subsidies. 
288 See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1235 (where the 
court stated that such a clause would be upheld in a conventional lease). 
289 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1(West 2000). 
290 Id. 
29\ 72 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947). 
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sons.292 In Glauner, a father was evicted on the basis of his 
children's activities. The father claimed that the violations of 
his children were not chargeable to him because he did not 
know about their activity, and could not be evicted unless he 
"authorized or ratified" the activity.293 The lease had an 
express provision, however, which stated that the "lessee and 
those occupying under said lessee will comply with and 
conform to all reasonable rules and regulations that the lessor 
may make .... "294 The court found that the landlord did not need 
to show that the father knew of or authorized the acts of his 
children in order to terminate the lease, because he was aware 
of his responsibility for the acts of other occupants pursuant to 
the lease clause.295 The rationale that the father can be held 
responsible for the acts of his children pursuant to the terms of 
the lease was the minority view of lease construction.296 This 
view, however, is parallel to that espoused currently in 
Rucker.297 
Prior to Rucker, courts were generally unwilling to find 
that clauses or statutes with language similar to the "One 
Strike and You're Out" policy provide for strict liability 
evictions.298 Courts acknowledged that tenants can be held 
responsible for the acts of their guests and occupants, and can 
thus be subject to eviction should their guest's or occupant's 
behavior materially breach the lease. 299 Upon either statutory 
grounds or the actual language of the lease, courts also 
acknowledged that a lease cannot be terminated absent "good 
cause."300 Thus, the tenant's must personally know of the 
guest's illegal activity,301 participate (or acquiesce) in the 
guest's illegal conduct, or fail to take reasonable steps to stop 
the illegal activity once it is known, for her tenancy to be 
292 [d. 




297 See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1235. 
298 See Wessington Housing Apts. v. Clinard, 2001 WL 605105 *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2001) and Diversified Realty Group, Inc. v. Davis, 628 N.E.2d 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
and cases cited therein. 
299 Diversified Realty Group, supra note 298, at 1084. 
300 [d. at 1085. 
301 Lloyd Realty Corp. v. Albino, 552 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (1990). 
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terminated.302 Regardless of whether the tenancy was 
federally subsidized, most courts were unwilling to impute a 
child's behavior or criminal acts to a parent unless the parent 
knew of or had reason to know of the child's criminal 
activity. 303 Additionally, courts propounded that imputing 
liability onto a tenant for associating with persons with 
criminal backgrounds or persons who engage in criminal 
activities is constitutionally defective.304 
The Illinois decision' in Diversified Realty Group v. Davis 
305 shows a courts' previous willingness to interpret private 
leases by applying a "good cause" requirement.30G Diversified 
owned rental property, which was insured by HUD, and thus 
was subject to HUD regulations.307 Diversified's leases 
contained similar clauses as those examined in Rucker, holding 
tenants responsible for the acts of their guests and prohibiting 
the use of the premise for unlawful purposes.30B Two 
individuals arrested for possession of cocaine and questioned 
by the police, claimed that Ms. Davis' apartment was used for 
the sale of illegal substances.30g The police entered and 
searched Ms. Davis' apartment, while she was out, and 
discovered a mixer with white powder residue in her son's 
closet.310 Subsequently, Ms. Davis was served with a notice to 
terminate tenancy due to the breach of the lease. 311 Ms. Davis 
argued that she did not know that her son kept paraphernalia 
in his closet, and was thus not subject to termination of her 
lease.312 Diversified asserted that the lease contained a strict 
liability clause which did not require the tenant's knowledge of 
her son's behavior to hold her responsible, and evict her.313 
The Illinois court construed the lease according to general 
contract and property principles.314 The court compared the 
302 See Tyson v. New York City Rous. Auth., supra note 254. 
303 See e.g. Santiago, supra note 237. 
304 Lloyd, supra note 301. 
305 628 N.E.2d 1081(Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
306 Id. at 1085. 
307 Id. at 1082 
308 Id. at 1084. 





314 Id. at 1084. 
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lease clause requiring a strict liability eviction for the acts of 
third parties with the requirement, within the same lease, that 
an eviction cannot occur absent some measure of "good 
cause."315 Thus, the court held that some measure of good 
cause, such as a nexus between the tenant and the criminal 
conduct, must be shown for a tenant's eviction based on the 
acts of her guests and children.316 Absent a minimal 
connection between Ms. Davis and the unlawful conduct, 
Diversified could not demonstrate good cause for Ms. Davis' 
eviction.317 
When a lease is funded only by state subsidies or not 
governmentally funded at all, state courts are not bound by the 
federal government regulations regarding public housing, and 
thus construe lease clauses according to state·law.31S Unlike 
the case in Rucker where an individual was evicted for the 
criminal acts of her family member or guest off the premise, 
state courts appear willing to recognize an "innocent owner" 
defense in the terms of the rental agreement or legislation.319 
Courts construe the particular lease clause as ambiguous, in 
order to interpret it through the lens of reasonableness, and 
thus allow admission of evidence regarding the parties' or 
legislative intent to determine the meaning of the terms.320 
Thus, non-tenants or family members who commit criminal 
acts, on or off the premise, are unlikely to have an effect on the 
primary tenant's leasehold, unless the tenant does not take 
active steps to remove them.321 
In accordance with the judicial reasonableness standard, 
determining the tenant's knowledge of the illegal activity is 
crucial for an eviction based on the actions of a family member. 
322 A New York court determined that where police entered an 
apartment and found 500 milligrams of cocaine in the private 
closet of a tenant's husband, the tenant's knowledge of the 
315 Id. at 1084-85. 
316 Id. at 1085. 
317 Id. 
318 See e.g., Wessington, supra note 298. 
319 Id. at * 1. 
320 Id. at *4. 
321 Id. (requiring that if the tenant knows, they must take reasonable steps to 
remove guest). 
322 See generally Diversified, supra note 298; Wessington House, supra note 298; 
Ramos, supra note 253. 
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husband's illegal activity must be shown to evict her.323 At the 
eviction hearing, the husband showed that the closet was his 
private closet; his wife was completely unaware of the 
cocaine.324 Further, he stated that she first discovered his 
habit when he was arrested and she immediately demanded he 
leave the house.325 The court determined that "a tenant will be 
liable for the illegal acts committed ... by a subtenant or 
occupant and is subject to forfeiture of the leasehold if the 
tenant had knowledge of and acquiesced to the use of the 
demised premises for such an illegal activity."326 The court also 
noted that where the tenant is not personally involved in the 
criminal activity, a "nexus" between the activity and premise 
must be demonstrated.327 Thus, because the wife did not know 
of the husband's habit, and the criminal activity of personal 
consumption did not imply the continuous nature of "illegal use 
of premises," the wife could not be evicted for her husband's 
possession conviction. 328 
Realistically, however, when an ex-offender lives with his 
family, the tenant family may have difficulties in claiming that 
they were unaware of his criminal propensities.329 In Marwyte 
Realty Association u. Valcarcel, the tenant's daughter and son 
were arrested for selling drugs out of the apartment.330 Mter 
the son was released from jail, the tenant allowed him to stay 
at the same apartment.33l The landlord subsequently brought 
an action to evict the tenant as an "objectionable tenant" 
pursuant to a New York statute.332 The lower Court found 
that because the tenant knew that her son participated in the 
"drug trade" out of the apartment previously, and yet she still 
allowed him to return to the apartment, the tenant was 
"condoning the illegal trade of drugs."333 The lower court thus 
323 Ramos, supra note 253. 
324 Id. at 582. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. at 511. 
327 Id. at 512. 
328 Id. at 512-13. 
329 See e.g. Marwyte Realty Ass'n, Ltd. v. Vaicercel, 559 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1990) overruled 
by Marwyte Realty Ass'n, Ltd. v. Valcercel, 579 N.y'S.2d 311(1991). 
330 Id. at 81. 
331 Id. 
332 NY REAL PROP. ACTS. § 711. 
333 Marwyte, supra note 329, at 84. 
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held that she was an "objectionable" tenant and could be 
evicted from the premise.334 
The requirement for a tenant's personal criminal conduct, 
however, has remained the crux of the judicial interpretation of 
a lease, regardless of whether the lease clause holds the tenant 
responsible for the conduct of others.335 For example, in 
Marwyte336, the New York Supreme Court, found error in the 
lower court's ruling, because there was "no claim of misconduct 
on the part of the tenant."337 Additionally, a Washington court 
restored a tenant to his rental property after being evicted for 
"engaging in criminal activity" where police found a marijuana 
pipe in his shed.338 The court found that where a statute does 
not specify who must engage in the criminal activity - the 
tenant or a guest - the court must construe the statute in favor 
of the tenant.339 The Washington court stated that only the 
person engaging in criminal activity should be evicted under 
the statute.340 Therefore, only the tenant's criminal activity 
can be grounds for eviction.341 Where the tenant does not 
personally engage in the activity, the criminal activity of 
another cannot be imputed on to the tenant.342 
Interpreting a lease according to state law is often more 
beneficial to the family members of the ex-offender, who may 
be at risk for losing their tenancies when they allow the ex-
offender to stay with them.343 If the state law governing 
private and public leaseholds is akin to that in federal public 
housing, however, the family members have little incentive to 
open their homes to the ex-offender.344 New Jersey's Anti-
Eviction Act is substantially similar to the federal "One Strike 
and You're Out" policy, and is enforced with the same strict 
334 [d. 
335 See e.g. Marwyte Realty Ass'n, Ltd., v. Varcercel, 579 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (1991); 
See also Hartson P'ship v. Goodwin, 991 P.2d 1211, 1215-16 (Ct. App. Wash. 2000). 
336 Marwyte, supra note 335, at 312. 
337 [d. 
338 Hartson, supra note 335, at 1212. 
339 [d. at 1213. 
340 [d. 
341 [d. 
342 See Marwyte, supra note 335. 
343 [d. 
344 [d. Although the Supreme Court overruled the lower court's decision in Marwyte, 
supra note 331, the time and cost of litigation the tenant had to endure would likely 
deter her, and others like her in other states, from allowing her ex-offender children to 
live with her. See also N. J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-611.1(d),(e),(n) (West 2000). 
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liability gusto, as it's federal counterpart.345 Tennessee has a 
substantially similar statute.346 The courts have yet to 
construe the Tennessee statute, however, as providing grounds 
for a strict liability eviction of a tenant for the criminal acts of 
a third person.347 Tennessee courts have interpreted the 
statute to require a tenant's knowledge of the criminal acts of 
the third parties in order to constitute grounds for eviction.348 
Courts more likely require that the landlord establish some 
connection between the tenant and the alleged illegal activity 
before the eviction is proper. 349 Mter the decision in Rucker, 
however, some courts may find strict liability evictions 
reasonable in private leases. 35o This proposition supports the 
United States Supreme Court's statement that "[s]uch 'no fault' 
eviction is a common 'incident of tenant responsibility under 
normal landlord-tenant law and practiCe. m351 
In public housing, an entire family may lose the homestead 
should a guest, occupant or subtenant engage in criminal 
activity, or have a prior criminal record.352 Should this be the 
case in private leases, a tenant could lose the leasehold for 
inviting friends or family members who may be criminal into 
their homes. Presently, courts have interpreted that the state 
statutes do not afford an eviction without some culpable 
conduct on the part of the tenant, even if the tenant is an ex-
offender. 353 State legislatures, however, are taking a turn 
towards enacting strict liability eviction statutes for private 
leases.354 Further, since the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Rucker lease clause as both reasonable and typical in 
private leases, private landlords may add this clause to their 
345 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18·611.1(d),(e),(n) (West 2000); See also Taylor v. Cisneros, 
102 F.3d 1334 (3rd Cir. 1996) (public housing eviction based on both the New Jersey Act 
and the federal clause). 
346 TENN. CODE ANN. § 66·28·517(a) (1993) 
347 See Wessington, supra note 298, at *5. 
348 Id. at *8. 
349 See Hartson, supra note 337, at 1215. 
350 Id. 
351 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1235 (citing to 56 
Fed.Reg. at 51567). 
352 Id. 
353 See e.g., Wessington, supra note 298 (while Tennessee's statute is similar to "one 
Strike," the court still found that the tenant must be personally involved in the 
criminal activity). 
354 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18·611.1(d),(e),(n) (West 2000) and TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 66·28·517(a)(1993). 
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leases.355 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's rationale in 
Rucker, state courts may now be more likely to enforce this 
strict liability eviction.356 
VI. PROPOSAL - LEGAL AND SOCIAL IDEOLOGY 
To achieve the result most beneficial to the society and 
afford ex-offenders housing as a first step to law-abiding lives, 
legislatures, courts, law enforcement and the community at 
large must cooperate. Currently, the primary providers of 
housing to ex-offenders are private not for profit organizations 
and religious institutions. To house the enormous ex-offender 
population, however, our nation must reevaluate policies 
pertaining to former criminals. 
First, our nation needs to prioritize re-entry housing in the 
budget and fund re-entry plans and programs. Although many 
resources are allocated to the creation and maintenance of 
prisons, the United States allocates little to the re-entry facets 
of the criminal justice system, such as ex-offender housing.357 
Second, the states should take a new approach to public 
safety, and ensure these ex-offenders receive their minimal 
living requirement of housing, by either implementing or 
increasing parole and probation. Many states currently employ 
parole and probation as a part of their punishment schemes. 
In those states, however, the purpose of these facets is 
supervision without assistance or services.358 Parole or 
probation officer caseloads of 70 are common, thus leaving little 
time for the officer to do more than supervise.359 Increasing the 
number of parole and probation officers would afford them 
more time to assist a recently released individual in finding 
both temporary and permanent housing. These officers would 
also have more time to connect and network with private real 
estate agencies in the community, who are apparently hesitant 
about renting to ex-offenders.36o With more time and 
355 See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, supra note 26, at 1235. 
356 Id. 
357 See generally, Petersilia, supra note 143. 
358 Id. at 3. 
359 Id. 
360 See Covington, supra note 154 (describing a non profit program, Weed and Seed 
in High Point, that assists ex-felons with housing); See also Petersilia, supra note 143, 
at 4 (describing the Safer Foundation in Cook County, which does similar networking 
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resources, parole and probation officers would be in a better 
position to determine which of these ex-offenders should be 
recommended to the housing agencies. Further, the state 
governments will save in the long run if they expend more on 
parole and probation, thereby reducing the need for prisons.361 
Third, legislatures need to reevaluate statutes like "One 
Strike and You're Out," and other statutes prohibiting the 
allocation of welfare and social subsidies to ex-offenders. The 
poor are more likely to encounter the criminal justice system 
than the rich. Thus, to receive adequate housing after release 
from incarceration, poor ex-offenders require financial 
assistance. Because state and federal resources are limited, 
legislatures should enact statutes providing for higher 
education and practical training in prison and jail, thus 
making ex-offenders employable. Providing offenders 
employment resources while incarcerated will decrease the 
need to allocate monetary resources to governmental subsidies 
for housing, or the creation and maintenance of more prisons. 
The community must also share responsibility for the 
integration of these ex-offenders. Without drastic and 
immediate changes to housing law, the 600,000 people released 
from prison this year will be systematically and continually 
recycled by the criminal justice. To change the dialogue of 
crime control in the United States and create positive 
advances, we must provide ex-offenders with living necessities, 
particularly, housing. Not until their housing needs are met 
will they be equipped to lead lawful lives. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Rucker, the "One Strike and You're Out" 
law, and the restrictions placed on federal subsidies for ex-
offenders are rippling into private landlord tenant law. 
Although the current screening techniques and eviction 
rationales used by private landlords are not as extreme as that 
within the public sphere, states are expanding their laws to 
become more analogous with the federal, publicly subsidized 
for ex-misdemeanants in Chicago). 
361 See James J. Stephan, State Prison Expenditures, 1996, iv, (Washington D.C., 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Bureau of Just. Stat., 1999) NCJ 172211 (in 1996 state 
governments paid approximately $20,100 per year to house a single inmate). 
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regulations. Should this occur, more and more offenders will 
be released to live on the streets, and most likely, return to the 
confines of the criminal justice system. Legislative, judicial 
and communal cooperation is necessary to help ex-offenders 
gain stable housing, and thus diminish the likelihood that they 
will re-offend. 
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